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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
DON BARTON, 
Plantiff-Respondent, 
-vs- Case No. 10722 
JOHN JENSEN, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Brief of Respondent 
L. E. MIDGLEY, 
415 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorney for Appellant 
DON V. TIBBS 
50 North Main 
Manti, Utah 84642 
Attorney for Respondent 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The parties will be referred to as they appeared in the 
lower court. 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an action by plaintiff for personal injuries and 
property damages arising out of a motor vehicle collision 
involving vehicles driven by the parties. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
This case was tried to a jury. The court submitted '" 
special verdict consisting of six "propositicms". After deliber-
ation the jury returned answers to the propositions in fav 01 
of the plaintiff and against the defendant. The Trial Court 
after polling the jurors entered a Judgment on the verdict 
in conformity with the jurors anwsers to proposition number 
6 for a total sum of $4,389.00 (See Polling of Jury as regarr],, 
to Proposition Number 3 - page 7). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant appellant seeks reversal of the Judgment 
on the verdict rendered by the lower cou1t Plaintiff-respon-
dent contends that the trial court's ruling sb0u1d be sust<lined. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On September 23, 18'65 the Plaintiff-rcspoudent WJ' 
driving his custom built International Grain Truck loa<leL: 
with 8,000 pounds of grain in a Southerly direction on Utah 
Highway 11, south of Chester, Sanpete Cuunty. ULah appi u·, 
imately 35 miles per hour. The defendant-appellant's pickup 
truck was travelling in the sam0 di1·ecticn at <1 slower speed 
ahead of the plaintiff. lt was 3: 30 p. m. in the afternoon. the 
day was clear and the road dry. Tht" plaintiff signalled b.> 
lights his intention to pass and started to pass in the cleat· 
opposite lane of traffic. The defendant without warning ur 
signalling turned his motor vehicle di2gonally left acrosss the 
said highway to enter a private field. P 1 a i n t i f f tried 
to avoid collision, but it was tn 1 late c.nd the t'.'lu vehiclb 
collided; the plaintiff's vehicle rolled (,ver, was damar:;ed, :rnd 
the plaintiff was injured. The grain was s::attered all ()\ 1 
the road 
'J 
" 
There were no homes in the area. (T. 6) Field pastures 
were on both sides of the road. There were no intersections, 
but there were some private gateways to the fields. (T. 7) 
The speed limit at the place of collision was 60 miles per hour. 
(T. 8) Defendant gave no signal to turn, either by light or 
arm. Plaintiff immediately hit his brakes and turned to the 
right to try to avoid the collision. There was a squealing 
noise, a crash and the plaintiff truck went out of control. (T. 9) 
Immediately after the collision, :?laintiff asked defend-
ant, "Don't you ever signal when you turn?" Defendant said, 
"I thought you was further back:" (T. 11) Defendant Jensen 
also stated, "Don't worry about your truck, it will be taken 
care of." (T. 18) Mr. Jensen also told a witness, Mr. LaVar 
Hill who came by after the accident (T. 96) 
"I said, (LaVar Hili testifying) 
"What happened?" 
He said, (Mr. Jensen, the defendant) 
"Well I was watching the truck coming behind 
me, and my guess in distance, I thought he was fur-
ther back than he was, and when I went to turn, 
he bumped me." 
The case was tried to a Jury who were submitted a 
Special Verdict o[ Six propositions (R. 46) . In proposition 
No. 6 the Jury itemized the damages p:aintiff suffered as ::1 
prominate result of the collision. 
It is concerning one of the Com·t's instructions and 
the special verdict and propositions, and the court's polling 
the Jury that the Defend~mt relies upcn in this appeal. Tlw 
trial itself and the evidence submitted is clearly in conformity 
with plaintiff's pleadi:igs, and the eddence warrants the 
finding of a verdict for plaintiff in the amounts stated of 
Medical expenses & X-Ray $ 54.00 
For cost of Drugs 66.00 
Truck Damage 715.00 
Damage to custom built attachment 763.00 
For loss of Turkey Feed (gram) 221.00 
General Damages - Including 
loss of earnings 
Loss of use of truck 
Total 
2000.00 
570.00 
$4389.00 
The verdict as above found was signed by six ot 
eight jurors. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE VERDICT AS RETURNED BY THE JURY, 
AS POLLED BY THE COURT, AND AS SIGN-
ED BY 6 JURORS IS IN FAVOR OF THE 
PLAINTIFF. 
When the jury returned at 6: 00 P. M. (p.122) the 
answers to the Verdict were not complete and it was obvious 
to the court and counsel the verdict was ambiguous. The 
court sent the Jury back to clear up the inconsistency. (p 123) 
The Court pointed out that the answers were im:onsistent. The 
Plaintiff could not be contributary negligent in not seeing a 
signal Defendant had been negligent in not giving. (T. 122) 
The foreman indicated they \vould consider it again 
and the Jury returned to the Jury room. 
At 7: 30 the Jury returned with their verdict. It w:i, 
:i 
obvious the Jury knew their decision but did not un-
derstand the Court in the propositicn No. 3 about Proximate 
Cause. The Court then polled the jury and after asking each 
juror for his answer, a verdict was rendered in favor of 
the plaintiff for the amount of damages set forth by the jury 
in its verdict. 
The amount of damages had alreo.dy been in the ver-
dict before the polling and the verdict had already been 
signed. It was obvious by reading all the questions and ans-
wers together that the jury intended the plaintiff to recover 
m the amount they found. 
It is the defendant's contention in this case that the 
Court should have accepted the inconsistent verdict, which 
the court refused to do. 
The principle is general (53 Am. Jur. Section 1099) that 
when a jury returns ::m insensible or inconsistent verdict, or 
one that is not responsive to the issues submitted, or is in 
disregard of the instructions of the c-iurt, they may be directed 
by the court to rec:.;nsider it and bring back a proper verdict. 
This may be done with or without consent of counsel. It 
should be done whether asked or not. 
As to special verdicts or to special findings the practice 
is really only an application of the settled rule that until 
the verdict has been filed (ff the jury has been discharged as 
unable to agree, their connection with the case has not come 
to an end. Even though polled, they may be sent back, after 
having announced their verdict, if the trial judge is not 
satisfied they have given the case proper consideration. 
When the jurors are sent back to reconsider their ver-
dict, they may amend it not only by correcting a mistake in 
form, or by making plain that which was obscure. They may 
alter i.t in substance, if they so agree. The case is still in their 
hands on their second retirement, and they are not bound by 
their former action, they are at liberty to review the case 
and bring in an entirely new verdict. (Grant vs. State - Flor-
ida -14 S 757 - 23 LRA 723.) 
While it is clear that the trial judge may send the jury 
back to the consultation room for the purpose of correcting 
their findings as to matters of informality and uncertainty. 
and where the issue has not been passed upon by them, yeL 
the Judge must not throw the weight of his influence into 
the deliberation of the jury as to matters exclusively within 
their province. 
In this case, there was nothing said or done by the 
Judge in any of his actions, statements or questions which 
would in any way have indicated that the Jury should find 
one way or the other. His statements were strictly for the 
purpose of obtaining from the jury their verdict. 
In 53 Am. Jur. Section 108~, it states the court 
may decline to receive a special verdict, the findings of which 
are inconsistent and manifestly m:c1<lc unde1· a m10~2pprehension 
of the instructions, and after explaining the instructions pre-
viously given, may direct the jury to retire for further con-
sultation. 
Section 1063 of 53 Am. Jur. states that-
"A Special Verdict as distinguished from the General Verdict 
is one in which the jury finds all of the facts of the case, and 
refers the decisions of the cause upon those facts to the court. 
The purpose of a Special Verdict is to furnish the basis < '' 
the Judgment to be rendered.'' 
Section 1015 of 53 Am. Jur. states that 
ln polling a Jury each juror must be questioned individually, 
and it is a reversible error for the court, when a poll is de-
manded to propound questions to the jurors collectively, 
instead of individually. 
In the present case the court on request of counsel (the 
reque.ot does not appear on the record but it was made in 
open court) polled the jury on the findings for the direct 
purpose of making sure that the jurors understood the ans-
wers to the propositions. Six of the eight jurors answered 
that the Defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of 
the collision -
(T.129) "THE; COURT: They are holding he did 
not give an adequate signal. 
PROPOSITION No. 3 
Was this failure to give an adequate signal a 
proximate cause of the collision 
Q Mr. Nell? 
A Yes. 
Q Mr. Childs? 
A Yes. 
Q Mr. Moss? 
A Yes. 
Q Mrs. Black? 
A Yes. 
Q Was his failure to give an adequate signal a prox-
imate cause of the collision? 
A Yes. 
THE COURT: Your answer is what? 
MRS. BLACK: Yes. 
THE COURT: Q Mr. Kenner? 
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A Yes. 
Q Mr. Anderson, was his failure to give an adequate 
signal as you have found, a proximate cause of the 
collision? 
A Yes." 
After the polling was completed the court entered judg-
ment on the verdict. 
In all the polling there was only one juror that indicated 
confusion, and as soon as he understood what the court was 
asking answered the question in conformity with the prior 
written verdict. 
Rule 47 (r) URCP - provides that if a verdict as 
rendered is informal or insufficient, it may be corrected by 
the Jury under the advice of the Court, or the jury may be 
sent out again. 
In this case the court on its own motion determined 
the first answers were inconsistent and instructed the Jury 
in conformity with Rule 47 (r) and 49 (b) to return to the 
Jury Room and make a consistent verdict. This the jury did 
and the latter polling showed conclusively the verdict oI the 
Jury. 
The defendant contends that the court misled the Jury 
- even going so far as to say that the statement of the Judge, 
"Don't overlook the instructions that the verdict is to be 
signed at the end" was misleading. 
The court's written instructions stated the verdict was 
to be signed. For counsel to now say that the oral statement 
caused their confusion would even argue with Rule 49 (bj 
which requires every verdict to be in writing signed by the 
9 
foreman. Obviously this statement by the Judge was not 
improper. 
Our Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 47 (r) recognize that 
there may be times when a verdict is not sufficient and it may 
be corrected under advice of the courts, or the jury may be 
sent out again. 
All communication between the trial judge and jury 
look place in open court in the presence of the parties and 
their counsel. It is clear by record there was no deliberation 
by the Jury in open court and it is clear by the answers to 
Proposition No. 3, set forth on record that the .Tury held that 
the Defendants negligence was the proximate cause of the 
collision. 
POINT TWO 
THE POLLING OF JURY WAS NOT 
REVERSIBLE ERROR 
Rule 47 (g) URCP provides the verdict must be in 
writing, signed by the foreman, and that either side may re-
quire the jury to be polled, which shall be done by the court 
or clerk asking each juror if it is his verdict. If upon such 
inquiry or polling there is a sufficient number of jurors agree-
ing the verdict is complete. 
In this case the verdict as rendered set forth specifi-
cally the damages found to have been suffered by Plaintiff. 
Because of the answer to Proposition 3 the court polled the 
,Tury for their answers. 
There was no deliberating by the Jury on the polling 
when the Judge asked the questions. 
Defendant in hi.s brief relies upon two cases, neither 
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of which is applicable here. 
In Carma-vs-Albertsen: 16 Ut2 145, 377 Pac.2 67, a slip 
and fall case, the verdict was not finished when the Jury was 
brought to the courtroom, they then filled it in, discussed it 
and then signed it. 
In our case the verdict was completed, signed and the 
polling took place because of the obvious mistake of the 
answer to Proposition number 3. On the polling, the Jury's 
answers showed they found the proximate cause of the collisi011 
was the defendants negligence. 
Defendant further relies upon Johnson-v.o-Maynard: ~ 
UT2 268, 342 Pac. 2nd 884, where the Judge went into the Jury 
room to advise the Jury on a point of law in the absence 
of and without the consent of the counsel. 
Obviously this is not our present case. Both counsel 
were present and the polling only took place after the ver-
dict was brought in properly signed by 6 of the 8 Jurors 
with specific findings on amount of damages to be awarded. 
In 71 ALR2, Section 2, p643 concerned with Polling 
Jury in Civil Cases it states: 
The object of polling a Jury is to give each juror an 
opportunity to declare his judgment in open court, to enable 
the Jury to avail themselves of the Locus Poenitenitiae and 
to correct a verdict which they have mistaken, or about 
which, upon further reflection, they have doubt, and to ascer-
tain with certainty that each juror approves of the verdicl 
as announced and assents thereto at the time of polling, and 
that no one has been forced or induced to agree to a verdict 
to which he does not actually assent. It has also been de-
clared that "polling the jury is but a means of obtaining ti1e 
--
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sence, in open court, of each individual juror, as to the cor-
rec.:tness of the verdict rendered, and is the most generally 
iecognized means of ascertaining whether the jurors are un-
animous in their decision. 
The trial courts discretion in respect to polling the 
jury is subject to review by the appellate court, but will not 
be interferred with unless it is clearly erroneous. (Hillsdale 
-vs-Hi Speed Co. Mich Case 47 N. W 2nd 652). 
The method of conducting the polling is within the 
discretion of the Judge. 
In asking questions the Judge should not interrogate 
a juror in regard to reasons for his conclusion. But where the 
jurors response is questionable further interrogation for the 
purpose of ascertaining definitely whether he does or does 
not assent to the verdict is permissable (Dixon-vs-Archer -
Tenn. Case - L\:ll SW:.:nd Gn.:;). 
Where special interrogatories are submitted to jury a 
polling as to the findings thereon or answers thereto has in 
many instances been held proper or at least not prejudicial, 
(91 ALR2 p 662). 
The exact form of the question is immaterial so long 
a~ it is directed merely to ascertaining whether or not he 
<issents to the verdict as announced. 
The court may permit a juror to correct or explain 
a response which, due to mistake, inadvertance, or misun-
derstanding, varies from the verdict as announced, or is am-
biguous. (Andersen-vs-Penn Hall Co. 47F. Supp 691, Hillary 
vs Earle Restaurant, Inc., 109 F Supp 829, Earl-vs- Times 
IVlt1r.:11 C.1 Calif. 196 Pac. 57.) 
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The mere irregularity in polling has generally been 
held harmless, so as not to warrant or require the granting 
of a new trial or the reversal of a judgment rendered on 
the verdict. (71 ALR2 57). 
In the polling this court conducted it is clear that the 
jury did not understand the meaning of Proposition No. 3. 
The polling brought out definitely that 6 of the 8 
jurors were answering question 3, "yes" that the Defendanls 
negligence was the proximate cause of the collision. 
The only purpose of the "Propositions" was to advise 
the court and this the polling did and the Judge correctly 
rendered judgment on the verdict for the Plaintiff in the 
amounts the Jury found and signed. 
RULE 49, URCP provides under Special verdicts and 
The court under our Rule for Special Verdict shall 
give to the Jury such explanation and instruction concerning 
the matter thus submitted as may be necessary to enable 
the Jury to make its finding upon each issue. 
In the present case the verdict as reached together 
with the polling as to the proximate cause found specifically 
all the facts essential for the determination of the cause. 
POINT THREE 
THE COURTS FAILURE TO GIVE DEFENDANTS RE-
QUESTED INSTRUCTION CONCERNING SOUNDING 
OF HORN WAS NOT ERROR. 
The court properly instructed in No. 9-J 
"There is no duty on the driver of an automobile to 
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sound the horn upon his intending to pass another 
vehicle." 
It further instructed in 9 (b) the following: 
"It was the duty of the driver of a car to use reason-
able care under the circwnstances in driving his car 
to avoid danger to himself and others and to observe 
and be aware of the condition of the highway, the 
traffic thereon, and other existing conditions; in that 
regard, he was obliged to observe due care in respect to: 
(a) using reasonable care to keep a lookout for 
other vehicles or other conditions reasonably to be 
anticipated. 
(b) not to attempt to pass another vehicle until 
he makes observation and ascertains that this can be 
done with reasonable safety under the circwnstances. 
You will note that the person whose conduct we 
set up as a standard is not the extraordinarily cautious 
individual, nor the exceptionally skillful one, but a 
person of reasonable and ordinary purdence. While 
exceptional caution and skill are to be admired and 
encouraged, the law does not demand them as a gen-
eral standard of conduct." 
Read together these instructions properly set forth 
the law. Plaintiff contends the Jury was not misled by these 
instructions. 
Failure to give a warning signal does not con-
stitute negligence when there is no apparent necessity 
for such a warning. (Nielson -vs- Lott, 81 Utah 265, 17 
P2d 272) 
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In our case the Plaintiff was following a vehicle going 
slow down a main highway, he started to pass within the 
speed limit when without warning the vehicle turned left 
in front of the Defendant's vehicle to enter a private roadway 
in an open field. Under these circumstances there was no 
duty to sound his horn. To require a horn signal would be in 
conflict with 41-6-146 UCA 1953. It would have the effect oi 
requiring a horn signal in the passing of every vehicle on 
these open farming areas. 
The correctness of an instruction is ordinarily deter-
mined by the test of whether the rule of substantive law 
therein stated is correct or incorrect. 
The court should not give undue prominence to the 
theory of one side or the other. If this issue of horn sounding 
had been singled out in any further way as the defendant 
requested the jury may have been misled into believing it 
was the controlling issue, which it wasn't. (53 Am. Jur. 568-
Trial) 
If the instructions considered as a whole fairly prese111 
the issues to the jury and state the governing law, error in 
individual instructions may be disregarded as harmless, and 
where statements of law contained in instruction are sub-
stantially correct they will not be condemned as prejudicial 
errors unless they tend to mislead the jury. (5 Am. Jur. 2nd 
810, Appeal and Error) 
Prejudice cannot be inferred on appeal from the fact 
that some of the instruction given by a trial court could huve 
been drawn more precisely. 
:t 
e 
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SUMMARY 
The courts instructions clearly set forth the law, the 
jury verdict as determined after polling by the court properly 
indicated that the jury found in favor of the plaintiff and 
against the defendant and the court properly entered judg-
( ment on the verdict in favor of the plaintiff. 
R. e~ectfoily'~~"-f~-~._~. 
DO; V~IflB~\~ ~----
Manti, <U:tah ) 
.. . ... /. 
Attorney fgt' t1t~ 1(."!-intiff-Respondent 
